



Security Council

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Dear Delegates,

It is my distinct pleasure to invite you to the Security Council of WorldMUN 2007. This year we will be discussing questions that have been plaguing the international community and international affairs since the turn of the millennium several years ago. As the United Nations looks to reexamine its role in the international construct, the two topics we will be discussing are at the core of any such discussion. What we do in this committee can make a significant change in the United Nations and the world for generations to come. The role of peacekeeping has often been discussed but never fully resolved. In the context of the world around us, however, a solution is pressing and thus the Security Council will deliver one. The question raised by movements of national liberation has been one intrinsically tied to the United Nations since its conception in the post-World War II era. By focusing on the past as well as the present, we can bring a fresh perspective to the issue at hand. I hope that you will find this experience both rewarding and interesting.

I would just like to take a minute to tell you a little bit about myself. I am a sophomore at the College concentrating in Applied Math and Economics. I grew up in Edison, New Jersey and I currently reside in Lowell House. Outside of WorldMUN, I participate in various other Model United Nations activities such as HMUN and HNMUN. I am deeply involved in campus politics and serve as a representative on the Undergraduate Council. I am also an avid dancer and perform Bhangra, a traditional form of Indian dance, with the Harvard Bhangra team. I love spending my time hanging out with friends, or playing and/or watching sports. In my opinion, American football should be the new US pastime, although watching the New York Yankees win would make my day, any day.

I just want to take a minute to remind you that this study guide is to serve as a general introduction to the topics, but should not be the only resource used during debate. I trust that all of you will take the appropriate amount of time necessary to adequately prepare yourselves for the conference. There is nothing worse than a delegation being "off-policy" and I hope that we can all avoid any such circumstances during the conference.

I cannot begin to tell you how excited I am to meet each and every one of you in the coming months. I hope all of you share that similar enthusiasm as we look forward to an exciting time ahead. If before the conference, you feel the need to contact me with any questions or comments you may have, I strongly urge you to do so. My email address at school is rbshah@fas.harvard.edu and my mailing address is 413 Lowell Mail Center, Cambridge, MA 02138. You can feel free to give me a call at my cell phone (908-510-9771) anytime as well. Best of luck with all your endeavors and I look forward to WorldMUN 2007.

Sincerely,
Ricky Shah

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INTRODUCTION

The Security Council is the only committee of the United Nations that has the power to do more than just recommend; it can authorize member nations to partake in different activities. The Security Council is the primary body responsible for dealing with any matters of international security and in the past few years the Security Council has tackled notable issues such as the situations in Greece and Palestine. The actions of the Security Council are pervasive in breadth as they impact not only a people, but a nation, and generations as well.

It is to this Security Council that we bring two issues that are challenging not only the conviction of our times but that of future generations as well. It is through our work that we will decide the future landscape of this community we call home. As the world around us plunges into violence can the United Nations continue to just “keep the peace”? While the notion of a peacekeeping force versus a peacebuilding force has been widely contested, there never has been a pressing need to reach a consensus, until now. As more and more denizens of the world succumb to violence and bloodshed, the United Nations must examine whether or not a shift in strategy is needed. Will the UN allow humanity to continue to fall to the very perils of combat? As the Security Council of the United Nations it is our task to put an end to this and bring a promise of hope and peace to the land.

The debate surrounding the recognition of National Liberation Movements (NLM's) is a recent



The United Nations Security Council

one. It has been the practice of the United Nations since the early 1950s to recognize movements of national liberation and aid them in their quest for self-determination. However, as demonstrated by the situation in Israel and Palestine, despite this recognition, the UN has been unable to help procure peace in some of these situations. Moreover, it has become harder, in recent years, to delineate between a National Liberation Movement and a terrorist organization. Thus, the United Nations perhaps must consider a better way to help bring peace to regions mired in conflict. The UN must examine those parties with legitimate claims to self-determination and work with them to establish a better future for all those afflicted by the conflict. Every individual has the right to a better life.

It is this right that we come to protect. The right for every man, woman, and child to truly be free. Free from violence, from fear, from hunger, from poverty, from suffering,

and free from the perils of war. That is our role as the Security Council.

History of the Committee

On 17 January 1946 the United Nations Security Council convened for the first time in Church House, London, UK. This marked a notable day in international history as the hard work of hundreds of individuals over the course of several decades was finally realized.

I say decades because the first efforts to create an international organization designed to ensure peace and security can be traced back to Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points in 1919. Wilson envisioned the League of Nations – a collective body that would provide a forum for all members of the international community to voice their concerns. Wilson had hoped that open dialogue would one day avert armed combat. However, with limited involvement from many of the major powers, the League of Nations became

nothing more than a formality in the international community. Luckily, Woodrow Wilson was spared from watching his beloved League wilt because he passed away in 1924.

The League of Nations may have been a debacle but the idea of a collective organization designed to promote peace and stability via a series of open dialogues caught the eyes of a later US President – Franklin Delano Roosevelt. On 14 August 1941, during the midst of World War II and prior to the US entrance, President Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain proposed the Atlantic Charter aboard the *HMS Prince of Wales*. In it, the two dignitaries proposed a set of principles for international collaboration in maintaining peace and security.

While the foundation had been laid, 25 April 1945 marked a watershed moment as delegates from 50 nations met in San Francisco for the United Nations Conference on International Organization. The delegates spent two months drafting the 111 article Charter which was adopted on 25 June 1945.

One of the auspices of the Charter was Chapter V which called for the creation of the Security Council and outlined its functions and powers. Essentially the Security Council was to reign as the supreme governor of the United Nations and was given the responsibility of settling any and all disputes that may arise amongst the international community. Thus, the responsibility of peacekeeping fell to this body and it is in this vein that we are discussing how best to improve a practice directly governed by the Council. National Liberation

Movements are both a detriment and an aid to peace and thus the role that the United Nations takes in matters relating to NLMs also falls privy to the work of this Council. Both of the issues at hand are pertinent to the constructs of international security and it imperative that this body, the Security Council, the arbiter of peace, discuss them thoroughly.

In the 51 years since the first Security Council met, much has changed, yet much has stayed the same. The Permanent Five Members of the Council continue to be China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. However, the council has expanded in size from 11 members to 15. In today's day and age, there is a clamor to expand the Council from its current size. When the United Nations first came into existence, it was a fledgling organization looking to find its role in the international community. It passed several important pieces of legislation on the conflict in Iran and the Middle East. Fifty-one years later, the United Nations is one of the world's largest organizations and the Security Council has transformed itself from a group of 11 to a group of 15 who wield significant clout in the international community. Interestingly enough though, the United Nations Security Council still continues to debate many of the same issues it did decades ago. While generations and wars have come and gone, many of the issues plaguing the international community have remained the same.

The powers of the Security Council are diverse yet pervasive. The Council has come a long way from its

days as a feeble body. As delegates to the Security Council of the United Nations you will be charged with the task of effecting change in the international community while trying to maintain a balance between intrusiveness and national sovereignty. The Council is no longer new, but I trust that you will thoroughly enjoy chartering through new territories as we look to tackle significant problems. Be not afraid as you challenge the bold.

TOPIC AREA A: THE FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

Statement of the Problem

A founding principle of the United Nations as evinced by its Charter is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Since the inception of the United Nations in 1945, this basic tenet of peacekeeping has remained central to its core despite its changing face over the course of half a century. Initially a Cold War mechanism designed to utilize light arms and a small military for ceasefires and border separation, peacekeeping soon evolved into a multifaceted approach toward the integration of military, as well as civil practices designed to secure and promote peace. As is often cited, in the first 43 years of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force, only 13 forces were deployed and in the 21 years since 1985, 48 have been deployed.

It is not the history of the peacekeeping forces that has come under much debate, but rather its future course. The end of the Cold

War marked a dramatic shift in policy and practice. In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, the United Nations reexamined its role in conflict prevention and peacemaking and embarked on highly successful missions in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, to mention a few. However, it is the dynamic nature of peacekeeping that is once again fueling debate. On 31 December 2005, the General Assembly of the United Nations, in conjunction with the Security Council, adopted a joint resolution calling for the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission. As outlined by the resolution, this Commission, seemingly an arm of the Security Council, would work to procure a long term peace through coordination with various agencies and representatives. Peacekeeping has been around since 1945, but a solution to long term peacekeeping is finally forthcoming.

Yet, as the nature of conflicts changes, and as the United Nations continues to ponder peacekeeping and longer peacekeeping operations, the notion of a peacemaking within the

United Nations has begun circulating among various echelons. There exists a school of thought that would like to believe the Peacebuilding Commissions is the beginning, a platform for further, more invasive peace making operations. Ultimately, the United Nations Peacekeeping forces will transform in one manner or another – the question remains in which direction.

History and Discussion of the Problem

U.N. Peacekeeping 1945 - 1988

On 26 June 1945, members of the international community gathered in San Francisco to adopt the Charter of the United Nations, by doing so they accepted the responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in

conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace, as outlined by the first clause of the first article. United Nations peacekeeping, as aptly stated

by Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, First Force Commander and Head of Mission of the United Nations forces in the Former Yugoslavia, is “based on a triad of principles that give it legitimacy, namely, consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of the peacekeepers, and the use of force by lightly armed peacekeepers only in self-defence.”^a In its earliest years, the United Nations was under the shroud of the Cold War and in the most tenuous of political eras; it found itself “maintain[ing] international peace and security” without the use of a single weapon.

In May 1948, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was created and the first operation was underway.

^b This unarmed unit was responsible for observing and reporting violations of the recently agreed upon ceasefire between Israel and Palestine. After a series of bloody conflicts, the two parties came to a consensus and UNTSO was deployed to act as a patrol. In subsequent years the United Nations would authorize the creation of the Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949 and a taskforce to monitor the De-Militarized Zone between North and South Korea in 1953.^c The first years of UN peacekeeping were marked by these small operations with limited personnel and staff that were designed to uphold stipulations set forth by ceasefire agreements – they acted as the patrols of the international community.

The United Nations peacekeeping troops did not see actual combat until 1950, when a situation on the Korean peninsula called for international action. In the



A United Nations peacekeeper

wake of a North Korean offensive, the Security Council organized a battalion of international regiments that fought under the banner of the United Nations. This unit, under the stewardship of the United States, fought alongside the South Koreans and helped force the North Koreans to retreat from South Korea. In the mid 1950s, there was a dramatic shift in UN Peacekeeping in the wake of what is now known as the Suez Crisis. The UN created the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) by passing Resolution 1001 on 7 November 1956.^d In the subsequent weeks, the first peacekeepers landed in Cairo and by February of 1957 the UNEF was 6,000 peacekeepers strong. Their mission was to return the Suez Canal back to its respective parties, evacuate Israeli troops from Egypt, and ultimately establish a buffer zone between the two bickering nations: Israel and Egypt. In May 1967, when the Egyptian government asked all UN forces to leave the land, the operation was considered a success.^e The United Nations, and in particular Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, had been able to coordinate the international community into organizing and spearheading a unit that was able to halt the hostilities and secure a peace in the afflicted region. The United Nations was no longer monitoring ceasefires – it was “taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,”^f as outlined in its Charter.

A watershed moment in the rules of engagement for UN peacekeepers occurred in July of 1960 with the creation of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC).^g With the Republic of Congo in deep



Thousands of people displaced from dozens of surrounding villages due to recent fighting gather in a church for shelter adjacent to a base of Pakistani peacekeeping forces in the village of Aveba in the Democratic Republic of Congo

political turmoil, both Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu pleaded to the Security Council for help. They wished that the international community could put a halt to the violence rampant in the region, the Belgian intrusion, and Moïse Tshombé's secessionist desires in the province of Katanga. The Security Council acted on these concerns and ordered Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Republic of Congo and called upon Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to provide the Congolese government with military and technical assistance until the nation's security forces were capable of independently defending themselves and fulfilling their responsibilities. It was in this vein that Secretary-General Hammarskjöld cemented three tenets into UN peacekeeping doctrine: consensus, impartiality, and non use of force. ONUC was

a success in part due to work of the United Nations in ensuring that the unit would work alongside the government, albeit in complete neutrality, yet would remain solely under the jurisdiction of the United Nations. This operation signaled the beginning of an era of multifaceted peacekeeping, or what many have later called peacebuilding. ONUC stepped outside the boundaries of traditional peacekeeping and coordinated civilian, financial, humanitarian, technical, and educational functions. It was this mission in the Republic of Congo that ushered in the construct of peacekeeping that dominated operations until the end of the Cold War.

Peacekeeping 1988 – 2000: (The need for change)

As the world was dominated by two superpowers during the Cold War, the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (USSR) and the United States of America, so too was the Security Council of the United Nations. With the fall of the USSR and an end to the Cold War in 1991, the Security Council shifted from this bipolarization and truly embraced the prospects of undertaking multilateral and more comprehensive missions. As signaled by the events in the Republic of Congo thirty years earlier, the United Nations peacekeeping forces looked to make peace and preserve it. Moreover, there was a shift in mentality among many in regard to the extent of peacekeeping. During the Cold War, peacekeeping was primarily utilized to combat inter-state rather than intra-state conflicts. However, with the end of the Cold War, a new societal structure emerged – one in which conflicts were present between different armed factions with different motives – and a new means of peacekeeping. Intra-state operations such as ONUC, once the exception, became the present day norm.

In the first 43 years of the United Nations peacekeeping history, only 13 operations were deployed. The same number of missions was undertaken from 1988 to 1992. There was a flourishing of ‘peacebuilding’ operations in this vastly different world. The United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, a malleable and dynamic entity, once again adapted to the times and began effectively executing many of the same strategies employed by ONUC. Peacekeeping was no longer resigned to its traditional role; rather, it began encompassing activities that ameliorated the political climate and infrastructure such as demobilizing

troops, promoting national reconciliation, restoring legitimate governments, organizing elections, providing humanitarian aid missions, and effectively transforming the role of the “blue helmets”.

To successfully handle the scope and nature of post-Cold War peacekeeping, the United Nations created the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 1992 and as its mission statement reads, “The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations”^h and even stipulates that peacekeeping operations “may be required to Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.”ⁱ As Philo L. Dibble, acting secretary of the Bureau of International Organization in Africa, said in front of Congress,

“The blue-helmeted monitoring of a static ceasefire line is now largely a thing of the past. UN peacekeepers now find themselves regularly charged with the responsibility of protecting themselves and innocent civilians in their areas of operation [and] there are often calls for them to be more aggressive still against ill-pacified rebels and irregular unit [but] unfortunately UN peacekeepers are increasingly the target of hostile fire.”^j

In the 58 years since the formation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, over 1900 individuals have died, with the majority of deaths having occurred in the post Cold War years (after 1989).

Despite the heightened activity and successes of the UN peacekeeping troops in the years immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union, in the mid- to late-nineties, peacekeeping suffered a significant setback as evinced by the failures of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995.¹ Even in the wake of post-Cold War peacekeeping activities, the UN had successfully been able to comply with the rules of engagement as outlined by Dag Hammarskjöld years earlier, yet the situation in Bosnia highlighted the need for reform and change. UNPROFOR was deployed in February of 1992 with troop strength of nearly 39,000 military personnel. The initial mandate of the mission was to promulgate the demilitarization of three “United Nations Protected Areas” in Croatia and protect the residents in these havens. However, the scope of the mission was extended to implement cease-fire agreements between the Croatian government and local Serb officials in March 1994, and later it was further extended to incorporate humanitarian assistance in response to Serbian aggression. It was this Serbian aggression that soon came to shock the United Nations and the international community when “Sniper Alley” became infamous as an area where Serbian snipers began attacking UN vehicles in Sarajevo in August 1994. From 26 May 1995 to 2 June 1995, Generals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic seized 284 UN peacekeepers in Pale, Sarajevo, and Gorazde and held them as hostages in return for the suspension of NATO bombings in the region.

The international community was appalled and many foreign leaders and dignitaries seriously discussed a withdrawal of efforts. United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, once regarded as the vehicle for security in the international community, found themselves in the most insecure of circumstances.

The shortcoming of the UNPROFOR extended far beyond their own operations. Despite being deployed to help procure a tangible peace, the unit was unable to prevent the humanitarian crisis. The United Nations had passed Resolution 819 that made Srebrenica one of the three “United Nations Protected Areas.” From 1993 to 1995, the UN monitored the region yet noted the increasing resistance it faced in patrolling and securing the region. By 1995, forces and supplies had been so debilitated that the Dutch Bat troops monitoring the region were forced to patrol on foot. Even worse, the humanitarian condition of the Bosnians living in the region was deteriorating as supplies were unable to be transported and many innocent civilians died from starvation. On 6 July 1995 the VRS or Bosnian Serb Army entered the “United Nations Protected Area” and by 10 July 1995 the troops had reached Srebrenica itself. The UN Peacekeepers pleaded for further support and artillery yet found themselves fighting this advance with their depleted strength and firepower. In the coming weeks, the VRS seized control of Srebrenica and systematically captured and executed up to 8,000 Bosnian men and children and took many more captive. On 19 April 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal

for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ruled in *Prosecutor v. Krstic* that “By seeking to eliminate a part of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb forces committed genocide. They targeted for extinction the 40,000 Bosnian Muslims living in Srebrenica, a group which was emblematic of the Bosnian Muslims in general.”^m The United Nations, designed in the

of the Peace Agreement, address humanitarian issues, and ultimately help in transitioning the region from the United Nations Protection Forces to the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). IFOR operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 20 December 1995 to 20 December 1996, and during that time seized control of any military actions in the



United Nations peacekeeping troops from India patrol a lava-covered neighborhood on the outskirts of Goma, in the North Kivu region of The Democratic Republic of Congo

aftermath of World War II, had failed to prevent the largest mass murder on European soil since World War II.

On 21 December 1995, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1035 and established the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) – a composite of the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a United Nations Civilian Office—following the transfer of power from UNPROFOR. The personnel within UNMIBH worked to implement the protocols

region. This force was immediately succeeded by the Stabilization Force (SFOR), another NATO-led initiative, whose task was to uphold the confines set forth by the Dayton Agreement or the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP).

It was the creation of IFOR and, later, SFOR that signaled an evolution in international security. Peacekeeping, long an integral function of the United Nations, had been relegated to a multi-national force led by the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO). Foreign leaders were disillusioned with the capabilities of the UN Peacekeeping Troops and in the wake of massacres in Rwanda and Srebrenica, it seemed as if the United Nations was no longer capable of maintaining international peace and security. The string of successes that marked the late eighties and early nineties was marred by the series of failures in the mid- to late-nineties. There was a certain ignominy cast on the “blue helmets” and as the world began changing, the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces seemingly needed to as well.

Redefining: The Brahimi Report (Panel on UN Peace Operations)

On 7 March 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan organized a Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to examine United Nations peacekeeping and security initiatives and asked members to provide a series of recommendations that would help enable the United Nations to tackle such peacekeeping activities in a more efficient manner. The panel, chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, released its report, the Brahimi Report, on 17 August 2000. This marked a watershed moment in United Nations peacekeeping history as the first ever set of conclusive recommendations regarding peacekeeping were made to the international community. The years from 1995 to 2000 had been marked by a relative inactivity in peacekeeping and it was hoped that the guidelines outlined in the Brahimi report would help bolster and strengthen the “blue helmets”.

The Brahimi Report called for a UN strategy for conflict prevention

and peacebuilding and recommended the creation of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) to “strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations”ⁿ in complex missions. Moreover, the Brahimi Report realized the need for robust doctrine and realistic mandates and stated that peacekeepers should be capable of defending themselves and that the “rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.”^o The panel also determined the need for appropriate resources and urged the United Nations to equip peacekeepers with the “intelligence, support and capabilities needed to mount an effective defense against violent challenger”^p and allow them to stop violence against civilians in compliance with the principles of the United Nations. The Brahimi report further outlined the need for improved information management, analysis, and mission guidance and leadership and called for the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). Lastly, the panel looked to create Integrated Mission Task Forces to better coordinate the different political, social, economic, and militaristic facets of any peacekeeping mission. The document radically altered the rules of engagement set forth by former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, by allowing UN peacekeepers the right to exercise self defense in the wake of violence, the United Nations would no longer be a passive and static observer – it would seize an active role in international security.

Case Study: The Changing Nature of

Congo

On 30 November 1999, the Security Council authorized the creation of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).^q Its initial mandate had been to demilitarize the region and ensure the propagation of human rights and appropriate humanitarian assistance throughout the land. In its earliest days, the mission suffered from a dearth in men and supplies and struggled much like most missions in the late nineties. However, on 24 February 2000, the Security Council passed resolution 1291 and strengthened the troop levels by authorizing the placement of 5,537 military personnel in the region.^r Moreover, the Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations thereby allowing MONUC to take the necessary action to ensure the security of its personnel, equipment, facilities, and civilians under the imminent threat of violence. Several years later, on 1 October 2004, the Security Council further strengthened MONUC by 5,900 more personnel thereby bringing total strength near 17,000 troops. Moreover the United Nations substantiated the troops by providing them with appropriate air and tactical support which jumpstarted a sluggish effort to demilitarize and disarm the region. What had once been an unwelcome presence in the Congo is now marked by a warm reception. The peacekeeping troops, with a renewed mandate, have begun to attack militia camps since the beginning of 2005 and reports indicate that peacekeepers have disarmed some 15,000 militiamen

through their efforts. Prior to the Brahimi Report, such mandates would have been far too removed from the traditional role of peacekeeping, yet these measures are demonstrating the UN's new approach to curbing violence and establishing a safe haven for the residents of a region. What had once been a fledgling and ineffective peacekeeping operation was transformed into what could be the prototype model of the future of peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping from 2000 to Today: The Future of Peacekeeping

From the dawn of the new millennium the United Nations has taken active measures to effectively improve Peacekeeping Operations. Many issues that once plagued UN forces have been resolved through the implementation of the Brahimi Report. But, many more still remain. Even five years after the Brahimi

Report, many of its recommendations have failed to be executed. Even those that allowed for more aggressive troop activity have come into question as critics fear the creation of a UN army. ' Whilst the United Nations pursues a reorganization of its operations, the international community continues to scale back funding for such endeavors. Ultimately, it is the work of this committee to tackle such issues and work together to propose a solution to the enigma that is UN peacekeeping.

Past U.N. Actions

The publication of the Brahimi Report in 2000 was heralded by the international community as the single greatest action taken on behalf of the United Nations to bolster the peacekeeping program. In the months after the Brahimi Report was published, the United Nations

peacekeeping forces were able to adopt some of the guidelines; in particular, those that allowed peacekeepers flexibility in using their weapons for self defense and even disarmament as evinced by the missions in Congo and Haiti. Moreover, in 2001 the United Nations established a Working Group of the Whole on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in order to examine the relationships between the Council, Secretariat, and Troop Contributing Countries, due to the "increasing complexity of peacekeeping operations." This working group worked in consultation with member nations to better coordinate peacekeeping operations and its recommendations were adopted when the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1353. This document allowed for integration between all related parties that would effectively help secure and promote peace. While this was seen as a success at the time, in the years since the publication of the Brahimi Report and the Working Groups recommendations, little progress had been made in regard to creating a lasting peace. The United Nations peacekeeping troops had been able to adapt from mere cease fire monitors to forces capable of limited active combat and maintaining a temporary peace, yet there still remained a gaping hole when it came to promoting a long standing peace between conflicting parties.

U.N. Panel on Reforming Peacekeeping

In December of 2004 Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that the highly touted UN Panel on Reforming Peacekeeping had released



Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan & incoming Secretary General Ban Ki-moon



Two members of the Red Cross bury the bodies of two militiamen shot by French peacekeeping forces upon coming under fire. The militiamen belonged to the Hema and were members of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC).

its report, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.” While the report highlighted many of the same problems outlined in the Brahimi Report, it recognized the distinction between a cease fire and a lasting peace and called for the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission that would “marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary.” On 20 December 2005, the United Nations adopted the recommendations of the report and the General Assembly voted to establish the Peacebuilding Commission, which would, in the words of Kofi Annan, “help countries make the transition from war to peace and perhaps most important of all, it will liaise with the international community to keep us all engaged in the long-term recovery effort.”^x On 23 June 2006, the 31 members of the commission convened for the first

time to begin its work. As a subsidiary advisory organ of both the General Assembly and Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission will serve to provide counsel on several cases a year in the hopes of integrating strategies for “reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development.”

While the virtues of such a Commission are lauded in the international community, many question the practicality of implementing such all-encompassing measures. Despite the mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission to coordinate all levels of long-term peacebuilding in a holistic approach, the problem remains that it is nearly impossible to have 31 member nations come to a consensus, especially when peacebuilding involves a series of divergent actors. As Rob Ricigliano, director of the Institute of World Affairs at the

University of Wisconsin, aptly said, “there are difficulties of bringing all these different disciplines and people together, who had previously worked in relative isolation from each other [and] the Department of Homeland Security in the US demonstrates the challenges that emerge when a new agency is set up to bring a series of different strands together.”

As the United Nations looks to transform itself, and it already has begun to do so, it needs to examine the perennial question of contributions of both a monetary and physical nature. As peacekeeping troops become more proactive, there is an exponential increase in risk which is tantamount to an increased death toll. The number of casualties for the “blue helmets” increased from 72 in 2001 to 131 in 2005 and the current tally is at 57 for the year 2006.^{aa} With the proposed battalion to be deployed to Lebanon in the coming weeks or months, that number is most likely to increase. Moreover, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has intimated that a comprehensive peacebuilding solution will not only require the collaboration of many actors but a long term commitment as well. The increased time directly correlates with increased expenditures even as the UN struggles to gather funding for its current peacekeeping mandates. The Peacebuilding Commission and Brahimi Report have signaled a commitment on behalf of the UN to ameliorate Peacekeeping Operations and ensure the vitality of a long lasting peace. However, it is the implementation of these measures that will allow the international community to judge the effectiveness of the UN in securing peace.

Proposed Solutions

U.N. Rapid Reaction Force

The Charter of the United Nations outlines a provision for a standing UN army or force and the idea has been flirted with since the early days of the organization. The strongest cries for such a force have come after the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the more recent conflict in Darfur. Many proponents of the idea believe that it is time for the United Nations to maintain a standing force of anywhere from 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers, military, police and civilian staff, including medics and conflict transformation experts. Supporters believe that such a force would better be able to immediately respond to conflict situations and neutralize the region before it succumbs to regional warfare. Moreover, the nature of peacebuilding is one which requires a multifaceted approach and this force, consisting of a diverse set of elements, would be able to handle such a need. However, detractors, of which there are many including the United States, are shocked with the notion of an autonomous United Nations military force capable of intervening at its discretion. Moreover, many developing nations are afraid that such a force would overshadow their national sovereignty. While the idea of an RRF has circulated for some time, is this the year it is put into action?

Increased Regional Involvement

Reports have found that regions which were once stabilized by United Nations peacekeepers have the same likelihood of succumbing to strife

as those in which the UN did not intervene. These failures to secure a lasting peace have prompted the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, but the idea of increased regional involvement should be looked at closely as well. Many of today's conflicts are intra-state matters affecting neighboring countries. If the United Nations could work to effectively utilize regional bodies in quelling tensions and procuring peace, it would be better able to incorporate the cultural and local dynamics to its peacekeeping operations. Moreover, strengthening regional organizations would allow them to play an active role in the long term monitoring of the situation.

Peacebuilding Commission

While the Peacebuilding Commission has already been heralded as an achievement, as illustrated above, much more needs to be done to ensure its success in long-term peacebuilding. Besides the obvious problems in reaching consensus in a 31 member advisory board, there is a larger "added value" problem with which the PBC must deal. As outlined in the background paper "The UN Peacebuilding Commission: Benefits and Challenges," commissioned by the International Peace Academy for the Regional Seminars, "Rather than simply adding a separate layer of complexity to existing processes, the PBC must define its 'added value' in relation to existing arrangements." Moreover, the PBC will not operate in a policy vacuum but will co-exist with multiple existing arrangements: to differing extents, post-conflict countries already have national leadership, strategies and benchmarks,

and systems of coordination and resource mobilization, thus further complicating its role. The international community must be able to clearly delineate an "added value" or else risk transforming the PBC into another generic body.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

Normally this body finds itself discussing issues of grave international security and concern. Yet, today we find ourselves concerned with what Kofi Annan has deemed a priority of the United Nations: internal reform. While not directly correlated with the preservation of international security, the role and fate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Troops will ultimately help construct the future world we live in. With that in mind, any resolution passed by this committee must address the issues outlined below:

Peacekeeping vs. Peacebuilding

Herein lays the central crux of debate for in the modern world many feel that the United Nations needs to help make the peace as evinced by the situation in Sudan. This is the issue that the body ultimately needs to resolve and in doing so, it too must consider several facets:

- *Contribution:* In the past, countries such as the United States have been criticized for not supporting the peacekeeping force. If the role is adapted to peacemaking, how does that affect the current construct?
- *Funding:* With an increase in funding to be expected as the UN forces take on a larger role, it is

critical for this body to provide for adequate funding in hopes of achieving success in this new endeavor. How exactly will that aim be achieved, if at all?

Sovereignty

When discussing any expansion of the United Nations, it is impossible to extricate the debate from one focused on the infringement of national sovereignty. Many believe that they are both directly correlated and this is an issue that must be resolved. How can the UN best protect sovereignty while adapting the role of peacekeeping troops in combat?

Long Term Peacekeeping

Many have criticized the United Nations for its inability to procure a lasting peace in any region and thus the body must examine how the United Nations can achieve something more than a temporal success.

The aforementioned issues are all pertinent to the times. However, there are certain more complex issues that need to be examined throughout the course of committee. Of the utmost importance is the relevance of 'case studies' such as the conflicts in Rwanda in 1994, Kosovo in 1999, and present day Sudan in calling for peacemaking or peacekeeping. The future of the United Nations and conflict ridden regions is full of possibilities and our decisions will impact its course.

Bloc Positions

United States

The US maintains a precarious situation when it comes to

reforming peacekeeping. While it has consistently been a staunch advocate of aggressive UN action in combating violence, the US is one of the most vocal opponents of a rapid reaction force. Moreover, despite clamoring for robust peacekeeping operations, the United States is looking for ways to cut back on spending and find a more equitable division of the costs in the Security Council.

United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Greece, Slovakia, Japan, and Ghana

The European Union member nations of the Security Council as well as Japan and Ghana have been the most vocal members calling for an overhaul of the peacekeeping operations. The EU nations have realized the need for long-term peace and the notion of peacebuilding, but are hesitant to grant too many aggressive and proactive powers to UN peacekeepers. Japan, as one of the largest fiscal contributors to peacekeeping operations, and Ghana, as one of the largest providers of military personnel, have been strong supporters of a transformation of the UN peacekeeping operations. This cluster of nations representing the EU, Asia, and even Africa are significant contributors to all aspects of peacekeeping and look to implement changes that will help ameliorate the situation for the future.

Russia, China, and Qatar

In the past months as the United Nations has looked to put an end to the conflict in Sudan, many nations have agreed to deploy a multinational peacekeeping force, yet these three nations have expressed certain disapproval over such a resolution.

Russia, China, and Qatar believe that no force can be deployed without express approval from the Sudanese government and have maintained their commitments to a peacekeeping process with strong connections to regional bodies. Moreover, Russia and China have often been criticized for their lack of monetary and military commitment to peacekeeping operations despite their status as a Permanent Five Member of the Security Council. Thus, it is uncertain how receptive these nations would be to a dramatic shift in peacekeeping.

Argentina and Peru

Argentina and Peru have committed troops to the peacekeeping operation in Haiti and have been proponents of the efforts of the United Nations. Moreover, while in Haiti, the United Nations troops have engaged in aggressive military combat to the expressed approval of many of the nations that have committed troops to the operation. Argentina has long been a contributor to UN peacekeeping and as such, the United States under President Clinton designated Argentina as a major non-NATO ally in 1998.

Congo and Tanzania

Both of these African nations on the Security Council have demonstrated a strong commitment to peacekeeping reform. The Congo has a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation underway and its government supports the aggressive stance the "blue helmets" are taking in combating warlords. The peacekeepers have gained the trust of the people as effective agents for security and the country has held a warm

reception for the work of the United Nations. Tanzania, as a member of the Peacebuilding Commission, has shown interest in procuring a lasting peace in many of the regions of the world, especially those in Africa. However, Tanzania has scrutinized the costs of peacekeeping operations and looks to balance lasting peace with a reasonable budget.

International Crisis Group

International Crisis Group is an international, non-profit, NGO, whose mission is to prevent and resolve deadly conflict through “field-based analysis and high-level advocacy”.^{ac} It operates by having teams of political analysts situated near regions of conflict produce analytical reports containing recommendations for international decision makers. In regard to peacekeeping, ICG has maintained a strong stance in favor of allowing peacekeepers to authorize force and strike preemptively to counter threats from armed insurgents. However, ICG maintains that such aggression has the potential to result in civilian casualties and thus it must not go unchecked.

Suggestions for Further Research

Since this topic is one that has been discussed in many circles for some time, one of the most important pieces of advice I can give you is to ensure that your information is still relevant for the times. When researching please make sure that your findings reflect the state of the world today and are appropriate for debate in 2007. While I strongly encourage you to examine some of the history surrounding the topic, please be aware that articles and solutions

proposed several decades ago may no longer be feasible in our world. Thus, it is imperative that you stay within your country’s foreign policy for the times.

With regard to understanding the topic and conflict, I urge you to take a deeper look at the roots of this discussion. First, it may be helpful to familiarize yourself with the Peacekeeping Missions presented in this study guide as well as some of your own. Only by understanding the current process and its limitations can you best propose a better solution. Consequently, it is imperative that you understand the subtler nuances of the nature of peacekeeping today as well. As many of you know, many nations are often castigated by the international community because of their failure to adequately finance and support UN troops. Thus, all of the current problems that plague the “blue helmets” will continue to be present and you must account for that.

In researching for this topic you should familiarize yourself with the news of the times. With every passing day, more and more information is available and you must continue to keep up with current events. Please feel free to use the Internet, magazines, and newspapers to help prepare for the debate.

As you begin researching the topic you may face some difficulties as you will be discussing a topic that many consider to be slightly scholarly. This topic is far different from ending a conflict and thus it will be challenging both for you as well as for me. Please, do not hesitate to contact me at any time as I will be available to answer any questions you

may have.

TOPIC AREA B – THE UNITED NATIONS AND NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Statement of the Problem

The end of World War II not only marked an end to era of colonialism and imperialism but it also signaled the beginning of an era of decolonization. Many new states were created from the once imperial lands of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and many more. In the years following the inception of the United Nations, newer nations were continually added as members to the UN. Many of these nations were liberated when groups seized arms and fought a movement for national liberation. These groups were referred to as National Liberation Movements (NLMs) and the United Nations made it its policy to help support NLMs in achieving their dream for independence and home rule. The UN felt that all people had the right to govern themselves and it would support such a cause.

Within this context of decolonization, there arose dissent and often what followed was armed resentment. If one looks to the years following the end of World War II, one can easily trace the beginnings of many of today’s popular rebel and para-state entities back to those years. The *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA) or Basque Homeland and Freedom, was organized in 1959 as a para-military Basque nationalist organization seeking to create an independent socialist state separate from Spain and France. The Palestinian Liberation

Organization (PLO) was founded by the Arab League in 1964 in the hopes of eliminating the State of Israel and replacing it with an independent and free Palestinian State. In 1969, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) split from the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) and in most contexts the PIRA is the group labeled as the IRA. These groups have been fighting for decades and much blood has been spilled while peace still remains elusive.

However, in 1993, after the signing of the Oslo Accords, the situation with respect to rebel, para-state, and para-military groups became far more complex. The United Nations had felt that by recognizing NLMs they could help integrate these organizations into international affairs and one day these experiences would help them govern a peaceful and secure state. There had been limited success to this practice in Namibia and South Africa as they were able to achieve liberation after years of fighting by the NLMs in the respective countries. With the signing of the Oslo Accords, it seemed that peace would finally arrive in the Middle East. As of today, the violence still rages on, and thus debate on this issue continues. Is it the practice of the United Nations to collaborate with movements of national liberation the best means to secure peace in a region? Moreover, by signing the Oslo Accords the international community recognized the PLO as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people. As of April 2006, the US State Department had recognized the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF)^{ad}, a subsidiary body of the PLO, as a terrorist organization. The lines

between a movement for national liberation and a terrorist organization have been conflated. It is up to this body to once again discuss the merits of a movement for national liberation and make a decision regarding the level of involvement the United Nations will have with them.

History and Discussion of the Problem

Rebel Groups and National Liberation Movements

History has shown that rebel groups have always dominated the political landscape because in the wake of dissent there is a human penchant to turn to violence and combat. Since the inception of the United Nations in 1945, the international community has been witness to an increasing involvement of rebel groups in international affairs. The policy stems from the UN's desire to recognize national liberation movements in the aftermath of the era

of colonialism and imperialism. The post-World War II years were marked by the process of decolonization as numerous liberation movements sprung up across the globe. In particular, there was an explosion of such groups in Africa as those that longed for their independence from European control began to organize. The pre-war penchant for colonization "prevent[ed] the development of international economic co-operation, impede[d] the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples and militate[d] against the United Nations ideal of universal peace"^{ac} as outlined in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Passed on 14 December 1960 in the General Assembly, this document acknowledged that "all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development"



Palestine Liberation Organization Training Camp

and effectively established a United Nations policy of recognizing national liberation movements (NLM's). In 1974, the United Nations granted the Palestinian Liberation Organization observer status and later in the year, by virtue of resolution 3280, the UN invited national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to participate in the work of the General Assembly.^{af} Despite the fact that many of the entities already cited, such as the PLO, are the official representatives of a minority or a faction and recognized by the United Nations, they engage in violence which is inherently in conflict with the principles of many states. Many of the activities undertaken by the PLO, in recent years, have been deemed terrorist acts under Section 2656f (d) of Title 22 of the United States Code as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents". The United States recognizes the Palestinian Liberation Authority as a sub-national group while the UN categorizes them as a national liberation organization. To further complicate matters, under the Geneva Declaration on Terrorism which was passed on 21 March 1987 it clearly states:

As repeatedly recognized by the United Nations General Assembly, peoples who are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination have the right to use force to accomplish their objectives within the framework of international humanitarian law. Such lawful uses of force must not be confused with

acts of international terrorism. Thus, it would be legally impermissible to treat members of national liberation movements in the Caribbean Basin, Central America, Namibia, Northern Ireland, the Pacific Islands, Palestine, and South Africa, among others, as if they were common criminals.

Thus, the predicament the international community finds itself facing is not one of impeding the violence but rather amending the current construct of recognition of national liberation movements. The nature of the situation is such that the current framework of recognition is perceived to ameliorate the social, political, and economic situation of the people directly affected. The United Nations believes that by recognizing national liberation movements and granting them observer status in the General Assembly that it is helping future governments interact in the international system at an early stage. Therefore, it can be derived that when the liberation movement finally realized its goals and achieved its aims it would better be able to bring peace and stability to its respective region. In some manners the United Nations' policy of recognizing national liberation movements stemmed from the notion that this practice would improve the political, social, and economic situation for the people afflicted in the conflict. That form of logic was the reasoning behind the UN granting the PLO observer status in 1974 and later in 1993 when it encouraged both parties – the PLO and Israel – to end the conflict afflicting the two by signing the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or the Oslo Accords. The UN had

hoped that the PLO would be able to prosper and bring peace to the region, yet 13 years later the international community still finds itself discussing the same conflict. This begs the question: is the policy of recognizing national liberation movements ineffective in procuring peace?

The second facet of the predicament the international community finds itself facing is that the United Nations allows national liberation movements to exercise violence in their quest for self-determination. This practice has made it difficult for nations to date to agree upon a universal definition of terrorism and thus the United Nations has not adopted any formal ones. Rather, the United Nations currently refers to the League of Nations Convention, UN Resolution Language, and definitions proposed by A.P. Schmid as possible meanings for terrorism. These two facets make it increasingly difficult to continue with the current construct of recognizing national liberation movements.

Case Study: The Palestine Liberation Organization and Peace

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded by the Arab League at the Cairo Summit in 1964 with the supreme intention of destroying the State of Israel and supplanting it with an "independent Palestinian state". Arab leaders had longed for an organization to represent the people of Palestine and the PLO was the brainchild of their desires. On 28 May 1964, the PLO officially adopted the Palestinian National Covenant or Charter and the Palestinian National Council convened in Jerusalem on 29 May

1964.^{aj} Only three years later, in 1967, the PLO found itself mired in conflict in the aftermath of the Six Days War. At the conclusion of the fighting, Israel had gained tactical control of the Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, and Golan Heights. In the ensuing peace talks, the United Nations passed Resolution 242 and what would be the cornerstone of Middle East policy for decades to come. The resolution called for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict [and] termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”

These words echoed the basic premise of a “land for peace” arrangement in which Israel would grants its neighbors their lands in return for a peaceful coexistence. Such a concept had never been broached before and the resolution marked a watershed moment in Middle East affairs. Moreover, the scope of this document had been intended to ameliorate Arab-Israeli relations in the context of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria but it would also later serve as the basis for relations between Israel and the PLO.

The PLO had been the official representative body for the people of Palestine and fittingly when the Organization of the Islamic Conference was established, in 1969, as an inter-governmental organization the State of Palestinian Authority, it was formally included

as a full member. This signaled the beginning of the presence of the PLO in international affairs as it was heralded as a formidable organization with much clout. The year 1969 also marked a pivotal time for the PLO because it signaled the beginning of Mohammed Abdel-Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Husseini’s (Yasser Arafat’s) tenure as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization on 3 February.

In 1973, another conflict broke out between Israel and a coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria. The coalition looked to regain many of the lost lands of the Six Day War and launched a covert invasion on 6 October 1973, but by 26 October 1973 the fighting had ended. However, on 22 October 1973 the Security Council had passed Resolution 338 which not only called upon “the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts” but also decided “that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”^{al} In recent years this has been heralded as the second most influential United Nations document to have been passed for it dictated the course of Middle Eastern affairs for several decades. The importance of this resolution stems from the single word “decides” because by choosing that word this document is not just a UN resolution, but a unique Security Council Decision; under the statutes and provisions of the United Nations charter this document is international

law and thus binding on all UN members.

In 1974, the Palestinian National Congress approved the Ten Point Program, which called for the establishment of the Palestinian Authority on any liberated lands and also sought to pursue the possibility of a secular bi-national state in the region under which all citizens would enjoy equal rights. This marked the first measure taken by any party to achieve a peaceful solution to the problem in the Middle East. On 13 November 1974, Yasser Arafat spoke at the General Assembly plenary session as a representative of a national liberation movement, and on 22 November 1974 the GA passed Resolution 3236 which “*reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including the right to self-determination... and national independence and sovereignty” and “*further recognizes* the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” On the same day the GA passed resolution 3237 thereby granting the Palestinian Liberation Organization official status as an observer member. In 1977, further headway was made as Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David accords – a move which infuriated many as they were disappointed with the limited nature of Sadat’s bargaining, but the process signaled two important changes. The first change was the first formal recognition of Israel by any member of the Arab world and the second change was that it signaled that communication and negotiation with Israel was possible.

A little over a decade later, on 15 November 1988, the declaration for the “State of Palestine” was approved by the Palestinian National Council. The Arab League immediately recognized this state of Palestine, yet the United Nations refused to recognize this state as it has had no formal jurisdiction over any territory. Despite the feeble attempt to create a State of Palestine, there was one important message relayed in the series of discussions that followed the promulgation of this state: Yasser Arafat continued to reference prior Arab summits and UN resolutions such as 242 and 338. In Geneva on 14 December 1988, Arafat formally announced his condemnation of terror and recognized the state of Israel and its right to exist as he remarked, “We want peace...we are committed to peace, and we want to live in our Palestinian state and let others live.”^{aq} This marked the beginning of the peace process for the Middle East - or so it seemed.

Peace – Now or Never?

After the United Nations granted observer status to the PLO, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made it clear that the US would “not recognize or negotiate with the PLO as long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338”^{ar} as recorded in a correspondence between the US and Israel. However, in the wake of Yasser Arafat's remarks in mid-December 1988 the United States, for the first time, openly entered into dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization to discuss the possibility for peace in



Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal looks on before the start of an Arab League Arab Foreign Ministers meeting at the Cairo-based league headquarters

the Middle East. Despite the United Nations recognizing the NLM in the mid-1970s, the PLO required the tacit acknowledgment of the United States for progress to be made in securing peace and stability in the oft-tumultuous region. **The UN had believed that these NLMs would, in their near future, lead to a viable government capable of procuring peace and thus their recognition was an important first step toward their fulfillment for home rule. However, it seemed that the UN tenet was merely a fancy thought without the support from major superpowers.**

On 14 May 1989, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel unveiled the Israeli Peace Initiative as a platform for Israeli policy in regard to a truce in the Middle East. The plan centered on four points: (1) the strengthening of ties with

Egypt as a regional behemoth, (2) the maintenance of successful peaceful relations with Arab states, (3) the improvement of refugees, (4) and Palestinian elections and self-rule for a five-year period. However, Israel had made it clear that it firmly opposed the creation of a Palestinian state in Gaza. It was this proposal as well as the Palestinian desire for peace that led to the Madrid Peace Conference on 30 October 1991. Co-sponsored by the USA and the USSR, the Madrid talks invited Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine to engage in a series of bilateral and multilateral talks. While the multilateral talks were designed to tackle pervasive regional issues such as the environment, the bilateral talks between Israel and Palestine were focused on interim self-government procedures followed by negotiations for permanent status. Since Israel had made it clear that it

would not negotiate with the PLO, the representatives of Palestine at Madrid were highly influential citizens of Gaza and the West Bank. While there was initial disagreement between the two parties, the Madrid conference resulted in a series of open and closed, bilateral and multilateral discussions between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The diplomacy between the two parties culminated on 13 September 1993, when Mahmoud Abbas and Shimon Peres signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or the Oslo Accords in Washington, D.C.

The document that had been finalized in Oslo, Norway on 20 August 1993, and signed at a public ceremony in September shared many similarities with the much disputed proposals of the Madrid Peace Conference. The accords called for a withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and West Bank and recognized Palestinian desires for self-rule by allowing the newly created Palestinian Authority to exercise jurisdiction over those lands. Moreover, the interim government would begin working toward a permanent agreement and thus the Oslo Accords failed to discuss issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, and security and borders. The Declaration of Principles also divided the West Bank and Gaza into three zones: full Palestinian control, full Israeli control, and Palestinian civil control and Israeli military control. The aim of the negotiations between both parties was to ultimately establish a permanent settlement as outlined by UN resolutions 242 and 338. In addition to the accords, Israel and Palestine

signed Letters of Mutual Recognition by which Israel formally recognized the PLO as the lawful representative of the Palestinian people and Palestine renounced terrorism and its desire for the destruction of Israel.

What was heralded as the most significant breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations soon crumbled in the aftermath of the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The Palestinians, beginning to feel helpless in their homes and frustrated with the lack of Israeli cooperation, turned to violence once again. With a series of suicide bombings ravaging the Israeli landscape, the Israeli army retaliated thereby destroying any sliver of hope for peace. The ensuing violence marked the demise of the Oslo Accords and with that, peace.

Analysis

In the years since, the two parties have scrambled for peace under the intense scrutiny of the international community. In 2000, representatives from the PLO and Israel met at Camp David at the behest of the United States to propose another solution to the Middle East conflict, yet no tenable resolution was reached. In 2002, the United States under the leadership of President George W. Bush proposed the “Road Map” for peace along with the United Nations, European Union, and Russia. To date, the international community continues to search for a solution.

In retrospect, dating back to the formation of the PLO in 1964, the role of the United Nations in securing peace warrants a closer look. It is evident that the UN was unable to bring peace to this oft-chaotic region despite recognizing the NLM in the

international community. However, the PLO was not a singular case of the United Nations recognizing such movements. In 1974, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa and the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia were invited to participate in ongoing discussions at the General Assembly. In 1976, the United Nations by passing resolution 31/152^{at} granted SWAPO observer status akin to that of the PLO.

On 21 March 1990^{au}, after twenty-four years of fighting, Namibia was finally declared free, much to the pleasure of SWAPO. On 27 April 1994, South Africa held its first universal elections and Nelson Mandela and the ANC were victorious in governing the first multiracial parliament. In the three decades since the UN allowed these rebel groups to participate in international affairs, there were certainly incidents where life was lost but ultimately peace was secured. What accounted for these differences in outcomes among Palestine, Namibia, and South Africa? Could it have been that the parties involved were far more willing to compromise in Africa or does the difference stem from a larger inability of the UN to secure peace? Do the actions undertaken in Africa stem from the volition of the people and eclipse the limited ability of the UN to abet the peace process?

Not only has it become increasingly difficult to judge the success and efficacy of UN recognition of national liberation movements in making peace, but this entire process has raised debate surrounding definitions. Exactly what constitutes

a national liberation movement? If it is a minority of people clamoring for self-rule against a firmly established government, what separates these national liberation movements from militant and terrorist groups that dot the globe? Since the UN has allowed national liberation movements to exercise violence to the extent that is allowed in war, what distinguishes an act of liberation from an act of terrorism? Many in the media have often proclaimed that one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist and if this is true, how can any barometers or standards be established that would differentiate between the two? If the United Nations intends on fulfilling its duty to the international community it is essential that a distinction between the two be made as expeditiously as possible. In today's age, if the United Nations were to support and recognize an entity which turned out

to be a terrorist organization, it could bode disaster.

The Future

The United Nations has always looked to bring peace to all corners of the world. However, as highlighted by the shortcomings in Israel, the best practice may no longer entail recognizing national liberation movements. It is this issue which the members of this Security Council must debate. Has the UN practice predating the 1950s run its course or is it possible to salvage the measures? In either circumstance, this body must deliberate how to effectively deal with national liberation movements in their present form today. To understand the scope of the problem, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), a research group of scientists and experts, has compiled a list of para-state entities. Some of these organizations border on liberation

movements while others resemble terrorist organization and as of 4 May 2006 the number of such groups was at 386. With so many rebel groups clamoring for their different needs, peace in many parts of the world seems difficult to achieve. It is up to the United Nations to help make that vision a reality or watch territories sink into chaos much like Palestine and the Middle East.

Past U.N. Actions

It is evident that the United Nations has played a significant role and taken many a decisive action when it comes to the matter at hand. Whether one looks toward the early years of the UN, when it adopted the policy of recognizing national liberation movements, or years later, when it granted observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization in the General Assembly, there is an expressed commitment to procuring peace through cooperation with these NLMs. Looking at the conflict between Israel and Palestine, in particular, since the later parts of the 1980s, the United Nations has systematically not been a part of any of the discussions focused on securing peace. The intended UN policy had been to work alongside these NLMs in their quest for peace, but somehow in the early 1990s the policy primarily morphed into United States-led bilateral negotiations between Israel and the PLO. The story then becomes one of past UN *in*actions.

The United Nations has been deeply rooted in the issue of Israel and Palestine since the later part of the 1940s. The UN was the integral player in the partition of Palestine



Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat shoulders an AK-47 while members of the media follow him as he arrives at a press conference in Amman, Jordan. (March 1970)

in 1947 and the creation of Israel in 1948. The UN Security Council was also responsible for passing resolutions 242 and 338: the two documents which have formed the cornerstone of all Middle East discussions for peace. The United Nations was actively seized in the matter for the majority of the years from 1950 to the later part of the 1980s. It was in the prelude to the Madrid Conference that the United Nations was finally ousted from its role as the principal mediator. The United States-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding signed prior to the conference clearly delineated that the United Nations would have no tenable role. Rather, discussion was to be led by the United States. In later discussions, the United Nations had a limited role at best. After the signing of the Oslo Accords, Madeleine Albright, the then-US ambassador to the UN, circulated a memo which expressed her desire to render irrelevant all existing UN resolutions on the matter for all "resolution language referring to 'final status' issues should be dropped, since these issues are now under negotiations by the parties themselves [and] these include refugees, settlements, territorial sovereignty and the status of Jerusalem." However, these ideas were the contentious issues that had been removed from the peace discussions and were to be discussed during a window period of five and then later seven years. After the seven year window expired and there was no peace, President Clinton convened a summit at Camp David in 2000 and the United Nations played no part, once again. However, in the wake of the failure of this summit, there was the beginning of a shift in policy.

The United States had solely led the initiative for bilateral talks during the 1990s but it seemed that in the 21st century, the United Nations would once again play a role. The exact role will be determined by our actions at the coming summit.

Proposed U.N. Solutions

Universal Definition of a NLM

Whilst it is already known that a definition for a National Liberation Movement exists, it must be reiterated that with the presence of terrorism, it has become increasingly difficult to delineate between the two. Thus, the international community must work to properly distinguish between NLMs and terrorist organizations. Only by separating the two groups can the UN best serve its purpose to help promote peace.

Involvement of Leading Nations with the UN

Leading nations in the international community have long shown a history of creating conflict and resolving it as well. As Mr. Tristan Dugdale-Pointon aptly said, "The conflict in Namibia illustrate[d] the involvement of super powers in Third World wars to fight the Cold War by proxy."^{av} His research led him to believe that much of the fighting in Namibia between the liberation movement and the government had stemmed from a larger issue. In contrast to causing war, the Madrid Conference stands as a testament to the power of several member nations to instigate peace talks. Were it not for the United States and the USSR, those preliminary talks would not have even occurred. Thus, if leading

nations can exercise their clout to help initiate discussions centered on peace, further progress may be imminent. However, much needs to be said about alienating the United Nations throughout the peace process. In the 1990s as the UN was left out of discussions, a tentative peace was reached, but ultimately that fell through as well. Neither the United Nations nor leading nations can help bring peace alone. Rather, with the combined efforts of both, the multilateral and bilateral talks can hopefully lead to peace.

More regional cooperation

All national liberation movements exist as rebel groups trying to fight an established government in hopes of achieving their goals. Thus, the conflict centers on a regional level and if the United Nations can successfully integrate regional organizations such as the European Union or the African Union in the peace process it may help expedite the venture. The regional organizations understand the local customs, the traditions, and the nature of the conflict, and by maintaining a complete, around the clock presence they may be better able to end the conflict. Moreover, regional organizations can help ensure that adequate humanitarian conditions are still being maintained in a region ravaged by war.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

Dear Delegates to the Security Council:

Long mired in conflict, Israel and Palestine are finally on the brink

of procuring a peaceful solution to the bloodshed that has defined the region. Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli government have, in conjunction with the United States, embarked on the 'roadmap' to peace. However, we have assembled in this body not to discuss the perennial crisis that plagues modern society, but rather to discuss a deeper international question that will define the construct of international relations in the future – that of international recognition and its ability to help secure peace. Thus, in that spirit, any resolution passed by this body must address the issues outlined below:

National Liberation Movements and Rebel Groups

The Security Council must examine the historical context behind the recognition of the PLO in 1974, and other national liberation movements and determine the distinguishing factors between these NLMs and rebel groups often castigated by the international community. Moreover, this body must also delineate between National Liberation Movements and terrorist groups so as not to confound the two.

Terrorist Organizations and the State

Despite claiming to be a party of the people, the international community, and especially the United States, has often felt the PLO is and has been a terrorist organization. First and foremost, this body must discuss whether the PLO is a terrorist group or an NLM. Consequently, it is the Security Council that must decide what legitimacy a terrorist organization has in leading a state if

such a conclusion is made.

The Present

This body, when discussing this issue, needs to examine the present situation in Israel and determine to what extent the recognition of the PLO has contributed to the peace or violence. In essence, if the PLO had not been recognized, would the current situation be different? Generally speaking, the Security Council needs to assess to what extent the recognition of an NLM has contributed to peace. How would this knowledge affect the future international framework?

A Larger View

Not only must the Security Council assess the extent to which the UN recognition has affected the situation in Israel, it must also take a historical look at the process of recognizing NLMs and ultimately deliberate whether such a measure is the most effective in making peace. If it is not, what actions should the United Nations undertake to help bring peace to regions dominated by resistance groups?

The Future

As evinced by history, the present construct of international recognition would seem to allow for the recognition of states governed by terrorists. This body must ultimately make a decision as to whether or not the United Nations will recognize future states led by terrorist organizations such as the PLO.

The aforementioned issues are all that are pertinent to the times. However, there are certainly more complex issues such as the nature of

the leadership (Arafat, Abbas, Sharon) in both nations that has contributed to the United Nations recognizing the PLO. It would be interesting to see what extent the people of the region have contributed to its peace. The future is full of possibilities and our decisions will impact its course. Best of luck to you all in your endeavors.

Bloc Positions

United States

The United States has played an influential role in the entire process, especially when examining the situation in Israel and Palestine. After the late 1980s, the US began shouldering most of the burden to bring peace and launched its own campaign to host its own set of discussions outside of the context of the United Nations. These efforts worked well, at first, and thus the United States adopted this practice as their standard policy in the 1990s. However, by the dawn of the 21st century it had become clear that the US would need significant help from other nations and institutions. With regard to NLMs, the United States has a mixed reception: it supports the people's right to liberate as long as their doctrine purports the ideals of the West. The US has been notorious for holding biases in this context. These biases seem to contribute to the United States' inability to firmly delineate between an NLM and a terrorist group and this has only furthered the inability of the UN to clearly distinguish between the two groups.

United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Greece, Slovakia, and Japan

These member nations of the European Union, as well as Japan, have long been proponents of recognizing NLMs and have poured millions upon millions of dollars to buttress their efforts, especially in the 1990s. However, after having followed in the footsteps of the US for the majority of the time, these nations are now looking to become more involved, politically, in the peace process. Similarly to the United States, they would only support narrow requirements to distinguish between the NLMs and terrorist groups because the flexibility would allow them to continue to support one or the other.

Russia and China

These two remaining P5 member nations have the most interesting positions on the issue. Russia is still in the midst of an ongoing conflict with Chechnya and thus would not be amenable to recognizing NLMs especially because the Chechen rebels claim to be a national liberation movement. In contrast, the People's Republic of China stemmed from a national liberation movement led by Mao Zedong. Thus, the Chinese are extremely supportive of NLMs, but are wary of the fact that many NLMs are subversive as they try to undermine Chinese communist doctrine. Moreover, the issue of Taiwan is a thorny one as many members of the international community claim that it is a national liberation movement.

Qatar

As the only Arab nation on the Security Council, Qatar is extremely supportive of NLMs, especially the PLO and its desire for a Palestinian

State. In the same context, it is highly skeptical of the West after the many failed attempts at peace between Israel and Palestine over the years. When delineating the difference between an NLM and a terrorist organization, one often hears the phrase, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Qatar, as representative of many of the Arab nations, would love to support NLMs, but oftentimes the movements that they recognize as NLMs are considered by many in the Western world to be terrorist groups. Thus, any debate centered on distinguishing between the two would immediately put Qatar at odds with many of the nations in the current Security Council.

Argentina and Peru

Throughout its history Argentina has suppressed rebel and guerrilla groups that threatened the government. During the 1970s, when a military government was in power in Argentina, resistance was crushed. Today, Argentina faces a precarious political situation rank with a collapsing economy and increasing terrorism. Thus, it is unlikely that it would support many movements for national liberation. Similarly, Peru has been plagued by two groups sanctioned as terrorist organizations by the United States State Department: the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. While there had been a crackdown in the late 1990s, in 2002 there was increased activity among these groups, once again heightening fears. Peru, too, would prefer a different strategy in securing peace rather than the current UN construct.

Congo, Tanzania, and Ghana

During the 1950s as nations such as the Democratic People's Republic of Congo and Ghana were finally freed from the shackles of imperialism and colonialism they began forming nascent governments. In these early years of their existence they were provided with economic, humanitarian, and military assistance from nations like the USSR and the USA. Moreover, with many of its neighboring nations such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe experiencing movements of national liberation, Congo, Tanzania and Ghana would be supportive of NLMs. Since political and military strife has continued to berate these nations, all three would look toward a resolution that would strictly delineate an NLM from a rebel or terrorist group. These nations would be opposed to recognizing many of the smaller armed resistance movements that plague them daily.

Suggestions for Further Research

When you begin to research for this topic you will realize that there have been an extensive series of publications on the issue. Many academics have spent their entire careers discussing this issue and thus you will easily find articles and journals that discuss the issue of Israel and Palestine in particular, and NLMs in general. Thus, it is imperative that while you gain an understanding of the history surrounding the issue, your information is pertinent to the Spring of 2007. Remember, it has been the actual policy of the United Nations to recognize movements of

national liberation and thus many of the readings you will find will support such measures. Moreover, in regard to the situation between Israel and Palestine, as you may already know or will soon know, it has been one of constant change: what had once started out as a relationship of antipathy has morphed, in recent years, to one of limited amicability and cooperation. Thus, your research should reflect such changes.

Since the United Nations has recognized several NLMs through the course of the last decades, it is imperative that you familiarize yourself with the exact nature of the UN actions and ultimately the response in particular situations. It is only by examining a series of case studies that you will better be able to tackle the challenge presented to you. It is difficult to formulate an entirely new approach to sustained peace and thus all historical perspective is necessary because hindsight may very well be our best friend. Moreover, as you may begin to notice, the UN has done prior work to formulate a new strategy and it will be in your best interest to read any such documents and use those as platforms to begin discussion in our committee.

An interesting aspect of any debate focusing on NLMs and Israel and Palestine begs the question of personalities. As you may undoubtedly realize, the conflicts have had their fair share of infamous or famous individuals and by realizing the role or power of these leaders, it will better help you understand the complications and nuances of debate centered on recognizing a National Liberation Movement.

Lastly, you should use the

Internet to your advantage. The Security Council website has amazing links to the early days of the SC when decolonization raised many issues as to the UN policy towards NLMs. Moreover, many newspapers have created online slideshows designed to trace the roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If you ever find yourself facing any questions, feel free to contact me at any time. I wish you the best of luck!

Position Papers

One of the many important facets of your preparation will be your position paper. On the most basic level the position paper is a synopsis of your research that addresses some facets of your country's policy on the issue at hand. While designed to allow the staff to understand your country's stance on the topics, it is just as equal of an opportunity for you to address some of the most basic questions for the conference. Your position papers will not only be read by me and the rest of the staff, but by the rest of the delegates

in the committee as well and thus I strongly encourage you to put the time and effort into writing a successful position paper. These papers will serve as an excellent starting point for you to begin to address your counterarguments as your papers will be visible to all.

The position paper itself should be written in English, with Times New Roman font size 12. Only use one page per topic thus resulting in each delegation handing in two position papers—one for each of the two topics. Most importantly, these should be written from the point of view of the nation and not the individual.

The position paper should



have three distinct parts. The first of these three will be a short synopsis of the topic and the motive behind discussing the issue at this Security Council meeting. The second facet of the position paper will be unique to each nation as you shall describe any actions taken on behalf of your government on the matter. Moreover, you will provide a general summary of your country's policy on the issue at stake. The last part of the position paper, which should also be the longest, will be the proposed solutions section. You must provide a set of solutions that your country wishes to propose to best tackle the issue. While the list need not be exhaustive, it should provide a glimpse of the many ideas you wish to present. Please note that the position paper, despite its many sections, is still to be one holistic document and cohesive.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact me at any time and we can answer any qualms or concerns.

CLOSING REMARKS

I hope that you have found the information in the study guide to be useful in any or all of your efforts to prepare for the conference. If you find yourself overwhelmed with information please do not find yourself panicking. I am always here at your disposal to answer any questions you may have.

This will mark my first WorldMUN conference and I cannot even begin to tell you how excited I am. I still remember when my friend came back from Beijing last year and told me he had the time of his life in that one week. I cannot wait to be a

part of this storied tradition with each and every one of you. Remember, at the end of the day, Model United Nations, and in particular WorldMUN, is not about winning or losing. It's about understanding a nation and in the process getting to meet talented individuals from all across the world. I look forward to meeting each and every one of you.

Best of luck!

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